After posting the ICP silliness, I figured I should post one of the best things I've read all month: The Wrong Stuff: James Bagian—NASA astronaut turned patient safety expert—on Being Wrong
"The Wrong Stuff" is a blog maintained by a woman who wrote a book on being wrong. She's interviewed various people about different aspects of being wrong. This guy is a former test pilot, former NASA astronaut, former anesthesiologist, and a few other things. Now he's the head of patient safety for the VA hospital system. It's long, but worth it: everything this guy says is insightful.
Some choice quotes:
And the Nerves of Steel Award, for his reaction to the Challenger explosion:
"The Wrong Stuff" is a blog maintained by a woman who wrote a book on being wrong. She's interviewed various people about different aspects of being wrong. This guy is a former test pilot, former NASA astronaut, former anesthesiologist, and a few other things. Now he's the head of patient safety for the VA hospital system. It's long, but worth it: everything this guy says is insightful.
Some choice quotes:
f at the end of the day all you can say is, "So-and-so made a mistake," you haven't solved anything. Take a very simple example: A nurse gives the patient in Bed A the medicine for the patient in Bed B. What do you say? "The nurse made a mistake"? That's true, but then what's the solution? "Nurse, please be more careful"? Telling people to be careful is not effective. Humans are not reliable that way. Some are better than others, but nobody's perfect. You need a solution that's not about making people perfect.
So we ask, "Why did the nurse make this mistake?" Maybe there were two drugs that looked almost the same. That's a packaging problem; we can solve that. Maybe the nurse was expected to administer drugs to ten patients in five minutes. That's a scheduling problem; we can solve that. And these solutions can have an enormous impact. Seven to 10 percent of all medicine administrations involve either the wrong drug, the wrong dose, the wrong patient, or the wrong route. Seven to 10 percent. But if you introduce bar coding for medication administration, the error rate drops to one tenth of one percent. That's huge.
You can't change the culture by saying, ‘Let's change the culture.' It's not like we're telling people, "Oh, think in a systems way." That doesn't mean anything to them. You change the culture by giving people new tools that actually work. The old culture has tools, too, but they're foolish: "Be more careful," "Be more diligent," "Do a double-check," "Read all the medical literature." Those kinds of tools don't really work.
In theory, punishment sounds like a good idea, but in practice, it's a terrible one. All it does is create a system where it's not in people's interest to report a problem.
If a patient is harmed by something we've done, we tell them. We explain what happened, we tell them that they're eligible for monetary compensation, and we tell them they can sue us. I don't know any other place that says, "Here's how to bring a tort claim against us." We do. We figure that if we hurt you, whether through malfeasance or not, we should make restitution.
So we make it easy. We just tell them. And we end up getting more torts filed, but the aggregate payment is less, because people aren't trying to get revenge. Most people just want us to pay for something specific, to take care of the problem we created. And a lot of people say, "Thanks for telling me, I'm not glad it happened, but I understand that it wasn't intentional." And that's that.
And the Nerves of Steel Award, for his reaction to the Challenger explosion:
People who hadn't been around the high risk stuff themselves, it changed their whole appetite for it. Others looked at it much as I did: It's a shame but it happens, let's go on. I had worked at a test pilot school and some of my best friends were killed while I was there, so it was not an abstract concept to me that people I worked with would be killed doing the job I do.